Interview mit Bruce Schneier über falsche Ansätze der Terrorprävention

Safe, But Also Sorry (Reason.com)

Interview mit Bruce Schneier über irrationale Methoden der Risikovermeidung in Zeiten der Terror-Abwehr.

Ausschnitt:

We live in a technological world, and it's common for us to believe that technology can solve our security problems. It solves so many of our other problems, so it's a plausible belief. It's also easier to believe that a shiny new piece of technology—a new ID card, a new airport scanner, a new face-recognition system—can solve our problems than boring old concepts like culture and economics. Admitting that technology isn't the answer is admitting that there isn't an answer that will solve the problem, and many people can't do that yet. We've forgotten that risk is an inherent part of life. [...]

The security vs. privacy dichotomy is a false one. Only identity-based security is in opposition to privacy, and there are limitations to that approach. I believe that approximately two security improvements since 9/11 have made airplane travel safer: reinforcing the cockpit door, teaching passengers they have to fight back, and—maybe—sky marshals. None of those measures has any impact on privacy. It's things like ID cards, and wholesale eavesdropping on telephone calls and Internet conversations, and large government databases that affect privacy, and their security value is minimal. The real dichotomy is liberty vs. control. There might be less crime in a society with strong government controls and police-state-like surveillance, but I don't think anyone would feel safer in that society. (Quelle: Reason.com)